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Abstract
It is widely acknowledged that the ratios of public debt over GDP reached historically high levels in the Euro area
during the recent sovereign debt crisis. More unnoticed however is the simultaneous increase in the share of
government debt held by residents that has started in late 2008 in most fragile economies of the area. This paper
develops a simple theoretical framework, in which multiple equilibria arise, to explain why exogenous increases in the
debt level may cause this share to increase, due to distinct expected returns on domestic sovereign debt for domestic
and foreign creditors in times of turmoil.
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1. Introduction
At the time that most Eurozone economies experienced a deep increase in their sovereign
debt to GDP ratios as a consequence of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, the share of
public debt held by the resident sector simultaneously rose in the fragile economies of
the area, as shown by Figure 1. Thus, the debt to GDP ratio increased from 41% to 90%
between 2006 and 2013 in Spain and from 104% to 129% in Italy, whereas the proportion
of domestic holdings rose from 49% to 70% in Spain and from 49% to 65% in Italy.
Figure 1: Joint increase in public debt and the share of debt held by the resident sector.
Several recent papers emphasized that the proportion of domestic public debt holdings
increased in peripheral countries in the context of the Eurozone debt crisis (Merler and
Pisani-Ferry (2012), Van Riet (2014), Acharya et al. (2014)), with domestic creditors ap-
parently playing the role of lenders of last resort. Empirical literature showed that this
increase was a direct consequence of the stress period on the Eurozone sovereign debt
markets (Brutti and Sauré (2016), Battistini et al. (2014)). This period was characterized by
higher debt to GDP ratios and more pessimistic expectations regarding the fiscal sustain-
ability of the Eurozone peripheral sovereigns.
Nevertheless, theoretical literature that strives to provide a credible rationale to under-
stand the causal relation between debt stress and the increase in the share of domestic
holdings has remained scarce. This makes it crucial to provide micro-foundations that
explain the variations in the share of debt held by the resident or the foreign sector. Un-
derstanding the transmission mechanism between sovereign risk and the proportion of
domestic creditors is indeed likely to have important consequences for default risk be-
cause the identity of creditors has been shown to impact the government’s decision (Men-
gus (2014), Gennaioli et al. (2014), Broner et al. (2014)).
To contribute to this recent strand of literature, we extend Gros (2012) simple model of
sovereign debt crisis by distinguishing between domestic and foreign creditors and by
modeling the government’s decision as a function of the share of debt held at home. Mul-
tiple equilibria, in which the share of debt held by residents is the endogenous aggregate
outcome that results from micro-founded creditors’ decisions, arise in the model. The
model then allows the investigation of the consequences of an exogenous increase in the
debt level on the domestic share of debt and on the government’s decision to default. The
model also provides some preliminary insights on the policy implications of a rising pro-
portion of domestic creditors during debt turmoil.
The mechanism of the model relies on two key assumptions that are backed by empirical
and theoretical literature. The first assumption is that the expected implicit return on do-
mestic sovereign debt is higher for domestic creditors than for foreign creditors in times
of sovereign debt turmoil. Indeed, as argued by Battistini et al. (2014), when the expected
probability of default differs from zero, domestic creditors have more incentives than for-
eign ones to invest in domestic sovereign bonds due to a combination of factors. First,
they explain this finding by financial repression episodes in which national governments
attempt to oblige domestic banks to buy domestic public debt. Financial repression makes
it indirectly more profitable to invest in domestic bonds for residents because it spares the
implicit cost of not complying with government pressure. Second, this finding can relate
to carry-trades in under-capitalized banks (mainly located in fragile economies), which
make risky debt more attractive for those banks. Third, this finding can be justified by the
possibility of an exit from the Eurozone that would make payoffs on domestic sovereign
bonds less attractive for foreign investors due to tran- saction costs. Finally, this find-
ing can be explained by ex-post bailouts for domestic creditors (Van Riet (2014), Mengus
(2014), Brutti and Sauré (2016)), which make default less costly for them. Therefore, al-
though the expected nominal return (that is, the nominal interest rate) remains similar for
domestic and foreign creditors in times of debt crisis, the implicit expected return differs
due to the additional expected benefits for domestic creditors and the additional expected
costs for foreign creditors.
The second key assumption is that an increase in the share of debt held at home decreases
the government’s incentives to default, all else being equal. According to the literature, a
higher share of debt held at home decreases the economic and political cost of repaying
debt. When domestic creditors hold a higher share of domestic public debt relative to for-
eigners, economic inefficiencies are relatively less costly because the outcome of taxation
is mainly redistributed to domestic creditors. Perhaps more importantly, a higher share of
debt held domestically also makes domestic bondholders less reluctant to pay taxes that
are directed at funding the reimbursement of sovereign debt because it enables them to
be paid back on the bonds they hold (Gros (2012)). Conversely, a higher domestic share
of debt raises the cost of default for the domestic economy for a given amount of debt be-
cause the volume of debt held domestically increases (Kremer and Mehta (2000), Mengus
(2014), Gennaioli et al. (2014)).
This paper’s objective is to contribute to the literature on sovereign debt repatriation in
times of crisis by developing a simple stylized framework. This paper provides a broader
micro-founded explanation to the debt repatriation phenomenon, interpreting it as the
result of diverging implicit returns for domestic and foreign investors due to a combina-
tion of factors. In addition, the model includes the distinct effects of an increase in the
domestic share of debt on the government’s incentives to default, which were identified
separately in the literature. Before identifying the cases in which a marginal increase in
the debt causes the share of debt held at home to rise, we first present the model and show
that multiple equilibria arise.
2. A simple model of debt crisis with multiple equilibria
2.1. The setting
The timing of the model is as follows: first, two groups of investors – a group of domestic
creditors and a group of foreign creditors with logarithmic utility – encounter an optimal
portfolio-consumption problem in a 2-period setup. Creditors decide what to consume in
period 1 (the variable C1) and what share ω of their savings W0 − C1 (with W0 the initial
wealth) to allocate to one-periodmaturity sovereign bonds, for which an exogenous quan-
tity d is sold on the sovereign bonds market. The remaining share of post-consumption
wealth 1−ω is allocated to a risk-free asset, which provides an exogenous payoff (assumed
to be zero for simplicity). Both groups are two infinite continuums of identical atomistic
agents over the interval [0,1]. Being a negligible part of an infinite continuum, each in-
dividual investor takes the aggregate decision as given. The optimal individual decision
is given by the solution to the following maximization program (the subscript j refers to
domestic investors when equal to D and to foreign ones when equal to F ):
max
C1,j ,ωj
ln(C1,j) + βE1[ln(C2,j)],
C1,j +
E1[C2,j]
ωjE1[Rj] + (1− ωj) ≤ W0,
0 ≤ ωj ≤ 1.
E1[Rj] is the expected gross return on domestic sovereign bonds for investors of group
j. The key assumption of the model is that this return differs for domestic and foreign
investors as soon as the probability of default is non-null.
For a given i∗ and a given expected probability of default E[p]:
E1[RD] = (1− E[p])(1 + f(i∗)),
with f(i∗) the implicit payoff from i∗ for domestic investors and f ′(i∗) > 0, as the implicit
return increases in the nominal return. Similarly, for foreign investors:
E1[RF ] = (1− E[p])(1 + g(i∗)),
with g′(i∗) > 0.1 Due to the additional benefits for domestic creditors and the additional
costs for foreign creditors that arise when the probability of default is distinct from 0:
f(i∗) = g(i∗) = i∗ if p = 0 and f(i∗) > i∗ > g(i∗) if p 6= 0.
The difference between payoff functions f and g for a given i∗ is increasing in the prob-
ability of default p because a higher probability of default deepens the differences in the
1Both f and g are assumed to be continuous functions in i∗.
domestic and foreign implicit returns on domestic sovereign bonds.
Second, a randommacroeconomic shock r affects the government’s fiscal sustainability af-
ter investors make their decision. r can take two values r1 > 0 and r2 < 0 with respective
probabilities p1 and 1− p1. This shock generates ex-ante uncertainty on the government’s
decision. Then, market clearing on the domestic sovereign bonds market imposes that
total demand QT equals the exogenous amount of debt d.
Third, the government observes the aggregate outcome of the investors’ decision (i∗, H∗),
with i∗ the equilibrium nominal interest rate paid on sovereign bonds andH∗ the share of
public debt held by domestic creditors in equilibrium, and the realization of the shock r
(either r1 or r2). The government then decides between repaying its debt d(1 + i
∗) (which
is augmented by the service of the debt in the second period) or defaulting on part of this
debt. The government makes its optimal decision by comparing CR the cost function of
full debt repayment and CD the cost function of default. When CR < CD, the government
repays its full debt d(1 + i∗), and the creditors are repaid on their investment in domestic
sovereign bonds. When CD < CR, the government does not repay part of its debt, and the
creditors loose part of the amount they invested in domestic sovereign bonds.
Both the government’s cost functions are assumed to be quadratic functions of the debt.
This assumption is motivated by the fact that it is intuitively appealing that a marginal
increase in the debt has a higher impact on the cost of debt repayment and on the cost of
default, the higher the level of debt. It is also motivated by the desire to maintain things
as simply as possible. In addition, the shape of the cost functions implies that the loss as-
sociated with debt repayment increases more with the debt than the loss associated with
default, which ensures that, ceteris paribus, the probability of default increases in the debt,
in accordance with intuition.2
The cost of full debt repayment CR writes:
CR(H
∗, i∗, d, r) = u(H∗)d2(1 + i∗)2 + r, (1)
The cost of debt repayment is related to the cost of taxation for the government. Raising
taxes to repay the debt is costly for the government: it generates economic inefficiencies
and, in a political economics perspective, decreases the support from domestic creditors,
who are also voters, for the government. u(H∗) > 0 represents a variable cost of taxation
coefficient, depending on the level of debt held domestically H∗. u′(H∗) < 0, as a higher
proportion of domestic debt holdings decreases the cost of taxation.3
The cost of default CD is:
CD(H
∗, i∗, d, h, L) = u(H∗)((1− h)d)2(1 + i∗)2 + v(H∗)(hd)2(1 + i∗)2 + L, (2)
where 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 represents the share of debt which is defaulted on. Its optimal value is
derived below. Therefore, the cost of debt repayment still must be paid for the portion of
2The specification of the cost functions relies on Gros (2012) but is modified in order to take into account
the role of the share of debt held by domestic creditors.
3The specification of the cost of debt repayment accounts for the stochastic dimension of the govern-
ment’s decision, by incorporating a random macroeconomic shock. When r = r2 < 0, the cost of debt
repayment decreases. Thus, the shock positively affects the government’s fiscal sustainability. It what fol-
lows, we refer to this shock as the ’positive shock’. On the other hand, when r = r1 > 0, the shock negatively
affects the government’s fiscal sustainability. In what follows, we refer to this shock as the ’negative shock’.
debt that is not defaulted on, as explained by the term u(H∗)((1− h)d)2.
In addition, the government encounters a cost of default for the portion of debt that is
defaulted on. L > 0 is a lump-sum cost of default, which is independent of the amount
of debt defaulted on and which can be interpreted as the cost of reputation; it occurs
whenever the government decides to default. v(H∗) > 0 is a variable cost of default
coefficient, depending on the share of debt held domestically H∗, such that v′(H∗) > 0
because the cost of default for the domestic economy increases in the domestic share of
debt. The optimal share of debt defaulted on, h∗, results from the minimization of the cost
function in case of default:
min
h
u(H∗)((1− h)d)2 + v(H∗)(hd)2(1 + i∗)2 + L⇔ h∗ = u(H
∗)
u(H∗) + v(H∗)
. (3)
Interestingly, the optimal share of debt that is defaulted on depends on the size of the
variable cost of taxation coefficient relative to the sum of the variable cost of default coef-
ficient and the variable cost of taxation coefficient. The share of debt which is defaulted
on thus decreases with the cost of default coefficient v(H∗), whereas it increases in the cost
of taxation coefficient u(H∗), in accordance with intuition. For a given H∗, if the cost of
taxation coefficient is higher than the cost of default coefficient, more than half the debt is
defaulted on in case of default.
Finally, when substituting h by the above expression (its optimal value), the cost func-
tion CD writes:
CD(H
∗, i∗, d, L) =
v(H∗)u(H∗)
u(H∗) + v(H∗)
d2(1 + i∗)2 + L. (4)
Both cost functions depend on the aggregate outcome of investors’ individual decisions:
the equilibrium interest rate on debt i∗ and the equilibrium share of debt held domestically
H∗. Therefore, for fixed values of the debt d and of the model’s parameters, the optimal
government’s decision varies with creditors’ decisions, which depend on the expected
probability of default. This finding leads to multiple equilibria, as described below.
2.2. The model’s multiple equilibria
Three distinct cases in the government’s decision may arise. In the first case, CR < CD
(meaning that it is costlier for the government to default than to fully repay the debt) in
both possible states, that is, even when the negative shock r1 hits. In this case, the prob-
ability of default is equal to 0. In the second case, CD < CR (meaning that it is costlier
for the government to fully repay the debt) in both possible states, that is, even when the
positive shock r2 occurs. The probability of default is 1. In the third case, the govern-
ment’s decision depends on the realization of the shock. When r = r2, CR < CD, it is thus
optimal for the government to repay the debt. When r = r1, CD < CR: it is optimal for the
government to default on part of the debt. The probability of default is p1.
The government’s best response to creditors’ aggregate decision is anticipated by both
continuum of investors when making their decision in period 1. Consequently, ex-ante,
creditors can coordinate on three distinct expected probabilities of default : 0, 1 and p1,
which leads to three distinct equilibria.
The optimistic equilibrium In case (1) in which agents expect the probability of de-
fault to be 0, the expected implicit return on debt is similar for domestic and foreign
creditors and equal to the nominal return (and f(i∗) = g(i∗) = i∗). Creditors’ optimal
decision (characterized by optimal consumption in period 1 C1 and the optimal share of
post-consumption wealth that is allocated in domestic sovereign bonds ω∗j ) is given by:
{C∗1 =
1
1 + β
W0, 0 ≤ ω∗1D ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ω∗1F ≤ 1}.
Because both domestic and foreign implicit return are equal when the expected probabil-
ity of default is 0, domestic and foreign demands for sovereign bonds are equal (ω∗1D =
ω∗1F ). This yields the equilibrium share of debt held domestically: H
∗1 = 1
2
. Indeed, the
share of public debt held by domestic investors in equilibrium is, by definition, the ra-
tio of the debt held at home over total debt holdings (those of both domestic and foreign
creditors):
H∗ =
ω∗D(W0 − C∗1)
(ω∗D + ω
∗
F )(W0 − C∗1)
.
Thus, in this case, this yields H∗1 = 1
2
, meaning that domestic creditors hold half of the
domestic public debt stock in equilibrium.4
Beliefs are then validated if and only if the probability of default is indeed null for this set
of individual decisions, meaning that CR < CD regardless of the realization of the shock,
that is, even for the negative shock r1. If this is not the case, because creditors are rational
(in the sense that the probability distribution they rely on coincides with the actual ex-ante
probability distribution), this set of decisions is never chosen in equilibrium. Whether this
set of decisions is optimal depends notably on the level of the debt d. Such an optimistic
equilibrium can arise solely provided that the debt level is not excessive. The interval of
values of d for which the optimistic equilibrium is a rational equilibrium is the interval of
values of d for which the probability of default is indeed null when agents expect it to be
and act accordingly (which yields H∗ = 1
2
and i∗ = 0). This interval is:
0 ≤ d ≤
√
(L−r1)(u(
1
2
)+v( 1
2
))
u( 1
2
)
if L ≥ r1, and it is empty if L < r1.5
4As the probability of default is expected to be null, agents are indifferent between investing in sovereign
bonds or in the risk-free asset. Market clears if and only if d ≤ 2ω∗D(W0 − C1) and it clears in i∗1 = 0 (as the
risk-free rate is assumed to be zero).
5The interval is obtained by isolating d in the inequality CR − CD < 0 in which r is substituted by the
negative shock r1 and the aggregate outcome of agents’ individual decisions H
∗ and i∗ are substituted by
1
2 and 0 in equations (1) and (4). If L < r1, it is never optimal for the government not to default when the
negative shock r1 hits because the lump-sum cost of default is too low relative to the shock that negatively
affects the government’s fiscal sustainability.
The pessimistic equilibrium In case (2) in which agents expect the probability of default
to be 1, their optimal decision is given by:
{C∗1 =
1
1 + β
W0, ω
∗2
D = 0, ω
∗2
F = 0}.
Indeed, in this case, given that a default is expected to occur in all states, there is no de-
mand for domestic sovereign bonds in period 1 (thus, the share of savings invested in
bonds is null ω∗2D = ω
∗2
F = 0) and the market does not clear. Such pessimistic beliefs are
validated for all values of d. Indeed, when there is no demand for domestic sovereign
bonds, the government is pushed into a roll-over crisis in period 1, regardless of the value
of d > 0. Therefore, the share of debt held domestically is null in the pessimistic equilib-
rium: H∗2 = 0.
The semi-optimistic equilibrium In case (3) (the intermediate case) in which agents ex-
pect the probability of default to be 0 < p1 < 1, their optimal decision is given by:
{C∗1 =
1
1 + β
W0, ω
∗3
D =
f(i∗3)− p1(1 + f(i∗3))
f(i∗3)
, ω∗3F =
g(i∗3)− p1(1 + g(i∗3))
g(i∗3)
}.
The optimal share of post-consumption wealth ω∗3j allocated to domestic sovereign bonds
results from the first order conditions of the representative creditor’s maximization pro-
gram. Once again, individual decisions determine the aggregate outcomes: the equilib-
rium share of debt held domestically H∗ and the market interest rate i∗.
Thus, in this semi-optimistic equilibrium, the share of debt held by domestic creditors is
higher than that held by foreign creditors, as H∗3 =
ω∗3
D
ω∗3
D
+ω∗3
F
> 1
2
, due to the fact that do-
mestic demand for domestic sovereign bonds is higher than foreign demand (ω∗3D > ω
∗3
F ).
6
Therefore, the share of debt held domestically in the semi-optimistic equilibrium is higher
than the share of debt held domestically in the optimistic equilibrium.
Regarding the market interest rate, the market clearing condition that is imposed on the
domestic sovereign bondsmarket is such that total demandQT equals the exogenous level
of debt d: i∗3 = Q−1T (d).
7
Beliefs are validated if and only if the cost of default indeed exceeds the cost of debt
repayment when the positive shock hits (that is, CR < CD when r = r2) and the cost of
default is smaller when the negative shock hits (meaning that CD < CR when r = r1) for
such a set of aggregate outcomes i∗3 and H∗3.
6Indeed, as p1 6= 0, we have f(i∗3) > g(i∗3) > 0 as stated above. Thus, ω∗3D − ω∗3F = p1(f(i
∗3)−g(i∗3))
f(i∗3)g(i∗3) > 0.
7Indeed,
∂ω3
D
∂i∗3
= p1f
′(i∗3)
f(i∗3)2 > 0 and
∂ω3
F
∂i∗3
= p1g
′(i∗3)
g(i∗3)2 > 0. Therefore, total demand for domestic sovereign
bonds is strictly increasing in i∗3 and thus bijective (as f and g are assumed to be continuous on R+ with
images inR+). Consequently, there is only one value of i∗3 such that market clears.
Therefore, the semi-optimistic equilibrium is rational solely for an intermediate range of
the debt level d, that is for all d such that:
√
(L−r1)(u(H∗3)+v(H∗3))
u(H∗3)(1+i∗3)
≤ d ≤
√
(L−r2)(u(H∗3)+v(H∗3))
u(H∗3)(1+i∗3)
if L ≥ r1,
and such that: 0 ≤ d ≤
√
(L−r2)(u(H∗3)+v(H∗3))
u(H∗3)(1+i∗3)
if L < r1.
Indeed, when d is excessive, default becomes optimal, regardless of the creditors’ beliefs,
although they coordinate on semi-optimistic beliefs; then equilibrium (3) is not a rational
equilibrium.
Finally, three distinct equilibria arise in the set-up: an optimistic equilibrium in which do-
mestic debt is equally held by domestic and foreign creditors, a pessimistic equilibrium
in which a roll-over crisis occurs, and a semi-optimistic equilibrium in which domestic
creditors hold a larger share of domestic sovereign debt relative to foreign creditors.
They may all be rational equilibria for the same level of debt d, depending on whether
agents coordinate rationally on the optimistic equilibrium, the semi-optimistic one or the
pessimistic one. Appendix A distinguishes the values of d for which several equilibria
may arise (that is, for which ranges for the debt level d identified above for each equilib-
rium coincide), depending on creditors’ expectations.
We now assess the impact of a marginal increase in the public debt to GDP ratio from d
to d′ = d + ε (with ε = △d) on the equilibrium, to show how debt turmoil that is charac-
terized by higher levels of sovereign debt may be associated with increases in the share of
debt held by domestic creditors and with changes in the default probability.
2.3. The impact of an increase in sovereign risk on the share of debt
held at home and on ex-post default risk
Amarginal increase in the debt can affect the initial equilibrium, either because the initial
expected probability of default is no longer validated when debt is higher, or because ag-
gregate outcomes H∗ and i∗ directly depend on the level of debt. Comparing the distinct
equilibria of the model in terms of the share of debt held at home allows the identification
of the cases in which this share increases following a rise in the debt. The three distinct
equilibria determined in the previous section are: {p = 0, C∗1 , ω∗1D , ω∗1F , H∗1 = 12 , i∗1 = 0},
{p = 1, C∗1 , ω∗2D , ω∗2F , H∗2 = 0, i∗2 = +∞}, {p = p1, C∗1 , ω∗3D , ω∗3F , H∗3 > 12 , i∗3 > 0}.
One can immediately observe from those results that the share of debt held at home
increases when there is a switch from equilibrium (1) to equilibrium (3) following the
marginal increase in d. In economic terms, the switch in equilibrium means that the debt
level is currently excessively high for full debt repayment to be the government’s opti-
mal decision in all states. Default becomes the optimal solution for the government when
the negative shock hits; the probability of default then increases from 0 to p1. In this
case, the share of debt held by domestic creditors changes from H∗1 = 1
2
to H∗3 > 1
2
.
This increase results from the fact that the higher debt level raises the default risk, which
makes the implicit domestic return on domestic debt higher than the implicit foreign re-
turn (f(i∗) > g(i∗)). Thus, domestic demand is higher than foreign demand (ω∗D > ω
∗
F ).
Whether such a switch occurs depends on the initial conditions (the initial level of debt d
and the initial beliefs), because they determine the initial equilibrium (1). Second, starting
from equilibrium (1), the likelihood of an increase in the domestic share of debt H∗ when
the debt rises is impacted by the size of the differences in the implicit returns on domes-
tic sovereign bonds for domestic and foreign creditors (f(i∗) − g(i∗)). Third, the switch
depends on the impact of the domestic share of debt on the cost of debt repayment CR
and the cost of default CD (through the variable cost of taxation coefficient u(H
∗) and the
variable cost of default coefficient v(H∗)) and thus, on whether the increase in the domes-
tic share of debt from H∗1 = 1
2
to H∗3 > 1
2
(which decreases the government’s incentives
to default as stated above) or the increase in the debt from d to d′ and in the interest rate
from i∗1 = 0 to i∗3 > 0 (which raises the cost of debt repayment) has more impact on the
government’s decision. This finding means that the domestic share of debt increases if
and only if its stabilizing impact on the government’s strategic decision of default is ex-
pected to be lower than that of the destabilizing initial increase in public debt. Otherwise,
the probability of default would not increase from 0 to p1, and then the equilibriumwould
not switch from the optimistic equilibrium to the semi-optimistic equilibrium. Eventually,
the switch depends on the impact of randommacroeconomic conditions, represented here
with two possible states.
Second, the domestic share of debt rises when the new equilibrium following themarginal
increase in the debt is equilibrium (3) starting from initial equilibrium (3), in which the
probability of default is p1, and the implicit return on domestic sovereign bonds for do-
mestic creditors increases sufficiently relative to the implicit return for foreign creditors.
Indeed, in equilibrium (3), the share of domestic debt holdings H∗3 depends on the debt
level d, because it is defined by H∗3 =
ω∗3
D
ω∗3
D
+ω∗3
F
, where ω∗3D =
f(i∗)−p1(1+f(i∗))
f(i∗)
and ω∗3F =
g(i∗)−p1(1+g(i∗))
g(i∗)
, with i∗3 a function of the debt d: i∗3 = Q−1T (d), as shown above.
Whether H∗3 is an increasing function of the debt level then depends on the size of the
subsequent increase in the implicit domestic return relative to the size of the subsequent
increase in the implicit foreign return. Indeed, the implicit domestic return should in-
crease sufficiently so that the domestic demand for domestic sovereign bonds increases
more than foreign demand following the increase in the debt, which depends on the rela-
tive slopes of both demand functions in the initial equilibrium point. Therefore, whether
such a switch occurs depends on the determinants that are noted in the previous case
and on the shapes of domestic and foreign demands with respect to the interest rate on
sovereign bonds i. Appendix B derives those results mathematically.
Therefore, two cases in the model enable the replication of the increase in the share of debt
held domestically following an increase in the debt level. These cases are associated with
constant or increasing probabilities of default.
3. Conclusion
In a simple and stylized manner, the model illustrates the mechanism through which an
exogenous variation in public debt can affect the share of debt held at home. The model
makes explicit the variables that impact the likelihood of an increase in the share of do-
mestic holdings of public debt and illustrates how this increase – which was observed
recently in the Euro area – impacts default risk.
Thus, although an initial positive debt to GDP ratio shock can cause the market interest
rate to rise, it may not be purely destabilizing for sovereign debt sustainability because an
increasing presence of domestic creditors simultaneously reduces the government’s in-
centives to default. In addition, the model provides a simple framework to explain how
the increase in the share of debt held by the resident sector can also result from exogenous
self-fulfilling factors that lead to switches in equilibria and variations in default risk.
Those results could suggest that economic policies that target both containing the increase
in public debt ratios and boosting domestic investment in sovereign bonds, which ensure
the credibility of the government’s willingness to repay its debt, may provide temporary
fiscal breathing space if further episodes of stress on the sovereign debt markets arise.
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A Multiple equilibria zones
In order to characterize what equilibria can arise for a given value of d, depending on
agents’ expectations, it is necessary to determine how the boundaries of each equilibrium
zone (which represents, for each equilibrium, the interval of value of d such that for those
values of d this equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium) are found relative to
each other. Equilibrium (2), which can be seen as a pessimistic equilibrium, holds for any
value of d. The boundaries of the equilibrium region (1) (the optimistic equilibrium) and
the bounds of the equilibrium region (3) (the semi-optimistic equilibrium) depend on the
market interest rate and on the equilibrium domestic share of public debt (through its im-
pact on the cost of default and the cost of taxation), which both vary with the expected
probability of default.
What differentiates the upper boundary of the equilibrium (1) region and the lower bound-
ary of the equilibrium (3) region is that the latter is characterized by a higher domestic
share of public debt (H∗3 > 1
2
) and a higher interest rate on domestic sovereign bonds
(i∗3 > 0). The higher domestic share of public debt in equilibrium (3) tends to make the
upper boundary of the equilibrium (1) region lower than the lower boundary of the equi-
librium (3) region – the stabilizing effect, through the impact on the cost of default and
cost of taxation. On the contrary, the higher market interest rate in equilibrium (3) tends
to make the upper boundary of the equilibrium (1) region higher than the lower bound-
ary of the equilibrium (3) region – the destabilizing effect, through a higher service of the
debt.
The relative location of the boundaries of both regions thus depends onwhether the desta-
bilizing impact of the higher market interest rate dominates or not the possibly stabilizing
impact of the higher share of debt held by domestic creditors.
The following figure provides an illustration of the distinct rational expectations equilib-
ria that can arise depending on d in the case where the destabilizing impact of a higher
market interest rate dominates the stabilizing impact of a higher share of debt held by
domestic creditors. The horizontal axis represents the level of debt d, going from 0 to +∞.
The green arrow delimits the range of values of d such that equilibrium (1) holds when
agents expect the probability of default to be 0. The black arrow delimits the range of
values of d such that equilibrium (3) holds when agents expect the probability of default
to be p1. Finally, the red arrow delimits the range of values of d such that equilibrium (2)
holds when agents expect the probability of default to be 1. It is true for all d.
Figure 2: Multiple equilibria zones.
B Proof of results of section 2.3
Let’s define A =
√
(L−r1)(u(
1
2
)+v( 1
2
))
u( 1
2
)
, B =
√
(L−r2)(u(H∗3)+v(H∗3))
u(H∗3)(1+i∗3)
,
C =
√
(L−r1)(u(H∗3)+v(H∗3))
u(H∗3)(1+i∗3)
, D =
√
(L−r2)(u(H
′
∗3)+v(H
′
∗3))
u(H′∗3)(1+i′∗3)
and E =
√
(L−r1)(u(H
′
∗3)+v(H
′
∗3))
u(H′∗3)(1+i′∗3)
.
In mathematical terms, the results displayed in section 2.3 can be rewritten more precisely
as:
• H∗ increases from 1
2
to H
′
∗3 > 1
2
when d changes to d′ = d + ε if and only if
A− ε < d ≤ A and B − ε ≤ d ≤ C − ε.
• H∗ goes fromH∗3 toH ′∗3 withH ′∗3 > H∗3 when d goes to d′ if and only if ∂H∗3
∂d
> 0⇔
f ′(i∗3) ≥ f(i∗3)(p1+(p1−1)f(i∗3))
g(i∗3)(p1+(p1−1)g(i∗3))
g′(i∗3) and D ≤ d ≤ E and B − ε ≤ d ≤ C − ε.
Indeed, first, when the initial equilibrium is equilibrium (1) ({p = 0, C∗1 , ω∗1D , ω∗1F , H∗1 =
1
2
, i∗1}), the only case in which the domestic share of debt rises following the marginal
increase in the debt level is when beliefs that p = 0 are no longer validated in equilibrium
and switch to E[p] = p1.
The initial equilibrium being equilibrium (1), this implies that d ≤ A, as shown in the
paragraph about the optimistic equilibrium. Equilibrium (1) no longer holds (meaning
that it no longer is a rational equilibrium) following the marginal increase in d if and only
if d > A − ε. Equilibrium (3) holds following the marginal increase in debt if and only if
B − ε ≤ d ≤ C − ε. Therefore, there is a switch from equilibrium (1) to equilibrium (3)
following amarginal increase in the debt to GDP ratio when the two following inequalities
are simultaneously verified for an initial debt to GDP ratio d:
A− ε < d ≤ A
and
B − ε ≤ d ≤ C − ε.
As ε is an infinitesimal quantity, ε → 0. Therefore, the first inequality implies that d → A
is a necessary condition for a switch from equilibrium (1) to equilibrium (3) following the
marginal increase in d.
If A ≤ B (meaning that the stabilizing impact of a higher share of debt held at home
exceeds the destabilizing impact of a higher interest rate) and if A ≤ C, we have: B − ε ≤
d ≤ A ≤ B. Therefore, there is a switch if and only if d→ A and B = A.
If A ≤ B and C < A, this reduces to A − ε ≤ B − ε ≤ d ≤ C − ε < A. There is a switch if
and only if d = A and C = B = A.
If B < A (meaning that the destabilizing impact of a higher interest rate exceeds the
stabilizing impact of a higher share of debt held at home) and A ≤ C, this reduces to
A− ε < d ≤ A. There is a switch if and only if d→ A.
When B < A and C < A, this reduces to A− ε < d ≤ C − ε < A. The switch occurs if and
only if d = A and C = A.
Second, when the initial equilibrium is equilibrium (2): {p = 1, C∗1 , ω∗2D , ω∗2F , H∗2 = 0, i∗2},
initial beliefs are still validated in equilibrium following a marginal increase in dwhatever
the level of d. Therefore, we still have H∗ = 0 following the increase.
Third, when the initial equilibrium is equilibrium (3): {p = p1, C∗1 , ω∗3D (d), ω∗3F (d), H∗3 >
1
2
, i∗3}, the share of debt held domestically cannot increase when the equilibrium switches
to equilibrium (1) or to equilibrium (2). However, in equilibrium (3), H∗3 and i∗3 depend
on the debt level d. Therefore, when d increases marginally, H∗3 and i∗3 are modified. As
i∗3 = Q−1T (d), it is an increasing function of d with no restriction (as QT is an increasing
function of i).
H∗3(d) < H∗3(d′) if and only if:
∂H∗3
∂d
> 0⇔ f ′(i∗3) ≥ f(i
∗3)(p1 + (p1 − 1)f(i∗3))
g(i∗3)(p1 + (p1 − 1)g(i∗3)) g
′(i∗3). (5)
Indeed, we can rewrite H∗3 as a function of d:
H∗3(d) =
(p1 − (1− p1)f [Q−1T (d)])g[Q−1T (d)]
p1g[Q
−1
T (d)] + f [Q
−1
T (d)](p1 − 2(1− p1)g[Q−1T (d)])
.
Eventually, this yields:
∂H∗3
∂d
> 0⇔ f ′[Q−1T (d)] ≥
f [Q−1T (d)](p1 + (p1 − 1)f [Q−1T (d)])
g[Q−1T (d)](p1 + (p1 − 1)g[Q−1T (d)])
g′[Q−1T (d)],
or, written as a function of i∗3 again, we get condition (8) if and only if f(i∗3) ≥ p1
1−p1
(as this
determines the sign of the inequality), which always holds given that ω∗3D (d) ≥ 0. Indeed,
as the denominator of ω∗3D (d) is positive, this implies that the numerator is also positive,
meaning that f(i∗3)(1− p1) ≥ p1).
Given that ω∗3F (d) ≥ 0 as well, f [Q
−1
T
(d)](p1+(p1−1)f [Q
−1
T
(d)])
g[Q−1
T
(d)](p1+(p1−1)g[Q
−1
T
(d)])
> 0. Therefore, the economic inter-
pretation of this condition is that a marginal increase in the debt to GDP ratio causes the
domestic share of sovereign debt to increase if and only if the marginal rate of growth of
the implicit return on domestic sovereign bonds for domestic creditors f(i∗) increases suf-
ficiently in the equilibrium interest rate relative to the implicit return for foreign creditors
g(i∗).
For the initial and the new equilibrium to be equilibrium (3), it is necessary and sufficient
to have simultaneously: D ≤ d ≤ E and B − ε ≤ d ≤ C − ε.
If condition (5) is satisfied and if the destabilizing effect due to a higher interest rate is
higher, that is B ≤ D and C ≤ E, this reduces toD ≤ d ≤ C− ε. On the contrary, ifD < B
and E < C, this reduces to B − ε ≤ d ≤ E.
